[QUOTE]Originally posted by midknightrider:
Just wondering...How does being a test pilot and Director of Advanced Technology at Raytheon qualify one to be a Technical Advisor to the
Commerce Department.
But that's par for the course for the Feds, call a plumber to rewire your house. hahahaha[QUOTE]
The hahaha is on YOU! Your knowledge of government is evidently incomplete. The Commerce Department has a very important role in review and approval (or disapproval) of the export of security-sensitive technology and materials, including chemicals and weapons, both nuclear and conventional. A person with the technical competence of Amanda Simpson, who has risen to the rank of "Deputy Director in Advanced Technology Development" at a major defense contracting firm, has important qualifications for this important work.
The excerpts below are from a paper reviewing the incompetence and malfeasance in the Reagan and Bush I administrations' Commerce Department, where this important technology control function was bungled badly, resulting in export of certain weapons and technology to Iraq and Iran. I do not know who headed up the Commerce Department's export licensing function at that time, but I suspect that those advising him/her did not have the technical competence of Ms. Simpson.
<<<<Thus the Commerce Department approved sensitive U.S. equipment that would go directly to Iraqi nuclear weapon, chemical weapon, and missile sites, despite the fact that the exporter was suspected of nuclear smuggling, and despite the fact that the importer declared an intention to work on rocket bodies. Commerce knew that the exporter was unreliable, and knew that the end use was improper, but approved the export anyway.>>>>
<<<<Commerce Department
Licensing Mass Destruction
U.S. Exports to Iraq: 1985-1990
by Gary Milhollin
June 1991
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Commerce licensed more than $1.5 billion worth of sensitive U.S. exports to Iraq from 1985 to 1990./1 Most were "dual-use" items, capable of making nuclear weapons or long-range missiles if diverted from their claimed civilian purposes.
On March 11, 1991, the Commerce Department released a list of those licenses. The list showed the equipment approved, the date, the value, the buyer in Iraq and the claimed Iraqi end use. This report is an analysis of the list. It shows, beyond any doubt, that U.S. export controls suffered a massive breakdown in the period preceding the Gulf War. When U.S. planes were sent to destroy Iraq's strategic sites, much of the equipment they bombed was made in the United States. The report finds that:
•The Commerce Department knew that millions of dollars' worth of sensitive American equipment would wind up in Iraq's missile and other military programs, but approved the licenses anyway.
•The Commerce Department failed to refer missile technology export cases to the State Department and nuclear technology cases to the Energy Department, in violation of its own procedures.
•Front companies for every known nuclear, chemical and missile site in Iraq bought American computers, with total American computer exports exceeding $96 million.
•American machine tools may have helped build the SCUD missiles that hit Tel Aviv and killed U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.
•American radar components may have helped shoot down U.S. aircraft and develop long-range missiles.>>>>>
Read all about this Reagan-Bush fiasco!
http://www.wisconsinproject.or.../iraq/LicenseMD.htmlMore information for your education:
http://archive.newsmax.com/arc...002/5/6/181707.shtmlhttp://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS...31/time/weapons.htmlhttp://www.strtrade.com/wti/20...chemical_weapons.pdf
